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INTRODUCTION

An essential truth has to be acknowledged-a computer cannot

function without data. Data constitutes both the information stored
within a computer and the programming instructions that allow a

computer to function. Legislators have sought to criminalise damage
to the storage device, to protect computer integrity rather than the data

itself ....

It is submitted that it is more appropriate to focus on what
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is actually being damaged, that being the data, than the box wherein it
is contained. 1
These words were written by a law student, Dane McLeod, who was
commenting on recent Australian approaches to tortious and criminal
offenses involving unauthorized access to or interference with a
computer environment. McLeod's comments contain interesting and
important observations that effectively illustrate the focus of much of
this Article. In discussing the creation of legal prohibitions on certain
conduct involving computers, McLeod criticizes the Australian
approach for focusing on the physical aspects of the computer system,
the "storage device" or "box," rather than what is actually of value
within the system, the "data." This approach is also evident, to some
extent, in other jurisdictions such as the United States. 2 However, the
law in some other jurisdictions more clearly focuses on damage to data
per se as opposed to damage to the "box" in which data might be
3
stored.
This Article utilizes a comparative case study to comment on the use
of property metaphors in describing aspects of information and
information systems in a legal and regulatory context. The relevant
"metaphor" literature is connected to the issues raised above in the
sense that the commentators on property metaphors in cyberspace point
to the ever increasing tendency to treat "cyberspace" as a "place" as if it
were akin to real property. 4 Even where a "personal property"
metaphor is expressly used 5 to describe cyberspace, aspects of real

1. Dane McLeod, Regulating Damage on the Internet: A Tortious Approach?, 27 MONASH U.
L. REV. 344, 350 (2001) (arguing that recent approaches in Australia to drafting tort and criminal
legislation regarding damage to information systems have incorrectly focused on the physical
attributes of computer systems, rather than on the valuable data contained therein).
2. As the following discussion will demonstrate, in the United States there appears to have
been some confusion, both in relation to the common-law chattel trespass action and the
application of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000), about whether the
harm to the plaintiff/victim is harm to a computer system or to information stored within the
system. See MARK LEMLEY ET AL., SOFTWARE AND INTERNET LAW 940-81 (2d ed. 2003)
(discussing the various aspects of the law of trespass to chattels as it applies to computer systems
and the application of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act in the United States).
3. For example, the British Computer Misuse Act creates offenses relating to unauthorized
accesses to, and uses of, material stored in computers, such as computer programs and computer
data. Computer Misuse Act, 1990, c. 18, §§ 1-3 (Eng.).
4. Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91 CAL. L.
REV. 439, 503 (2003); Maureen O'Rourke, Property Rights and Competition on the Internet: In
Search of an Appropriate Analogy, 16 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 561, 586 (2001). See generally
Mark A. Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 CAL. L. REV. 521 (2003).
5. See eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1069-70 (N.D. Cal. 2000)
(raising "chattel trespass" arguments in relation to computer systems based on personal property
rights in servers).
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property still seem to creep into the relevant discussions. 6 This
potentially leads to the drafting and interpretation of laws premised on
"real-place-like" concepts, such as trespass, rather than laws that focus
on protecting the7 item of real value to the complainant: the data stored
within a system.
The following discussion provides a basic critique of the use of
property metaphors in cyberspace.
It employs a case study on
American and European Union laws relating to "bad faith," or
unauthorized, accesses to and uses of "proprietary" information stored
within information systems. The fundamental points argued are set out
as follows:

(A)

It is impossible to avoid the use of property metaphors in

cyberspace. 8 However, such metaphors should be used with care. Real
property metaphors should be avoided altogether. 9 Personal property
metaphors are appropriate both to describe the physical hardware
aspects of computer systems, which are incontrovertibly a species of
tangible personal property, and also to describe the information/data
contained within the systems, a proposition that some may find more

controversial.10
(B) Once we accept the personal property label for both physical
computer systems and information/data, it is necessary to decide just
what aspects of cyberspace should appropriately be regulated. There

6. See Dan L. Burk, The Trouble with Trespass, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 27, 28-32
(2000) (noting the confusion between real and personal property analogies in deciding computer
trespass cases); see also LEMLEY ET AL., supra note 2, at 948; Hunter, supra note 4, at 503.
7. McLeod, supra note I, at 350.
8. Hunter, supra note 4, at 444 (suggesting that the property metaphor is very powerful as a
matter of human cognition).
9. Id. at 516; Lemley, supra note 4, at 540.
10. There is a growing body of literature in which concerns have been expressed about the
law's tendency to "over-propertize" information and information products. E.g., Mark A.
Lemley, Private Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1545 (2000) (examining arguments for and against
treating personal information as property); Jacqueline Lipton, Information Wants To Be Property:
Legal Commodification of E-Commerce Assets, 16 INT'L REV. L. COMP. & TECH. 53 (2002)
(examining moves in a number of jurisdictions toward the increasing propertization of
information products); John R. Therien, Exorcising the Specter of a "Pay-per-use" Society:
Toward PreservingFair Use and the Public Domain in the DigitalAge, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
979 (2001) (discussing concerns that the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA") will overpropertize digital information if courts do not take an adequate stance on protecting fair uses).
But see Anupam Chander, The New, New Property, 81 TEX. L. REV. 715, 778-79 (2003)
(suggesting that it may not be propertization per se that is the problem but rather the way in which
property rights are utilized and regulated in the digital economy). See generally J.H. Reichman &
Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50 VAND. L. REV. 51 (1997)
(discussing the concerns about creating powerful property rights in databases in the United
States).
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may be a place for regulating conduct harmful to physical computer
systems, but what is probably of greater importance and concern is
creating a sensible approach to regulating unauthorized bad faith
conduct involving digital data.
(C) It is therefore necessary to decide, both domestically and
globally, what types of conduct in relation to such data should be
proscribed, and how those proscriptions might be enforced effectively.
Some possible approaches to these issues are suggested below.
Part II briefly surveys concerns about the use of property metaphors
in cyberspace and explains why the use of personal property
(information-as-thing)" metaphors cannot, and indeed need not, be
avoided in cyberspace.
Digital data is the item of paramount
importance to those operating online businesses. The appropriate focus
of any information/information technology law should be on protecting
rights in this data or information, as distinct from rights in computer
systems in which data or information might be stored or through which
it might be transmitted.
Part III identifies the conduct that might be proscribed by law in
relation to such data. Those who hold proprietary interests in data are
concerned primarily with four possible unauthorized activities: (a)
unauthorized access, (b) unauthorized use, (c) unauthorized
damage/destruction, and (d) theft/misappropriation.
A regulatory
framework organized around these forms of conduct is most likely to
achieve internal consistency and meet the needs of those who hold
proprietary interests in information. Such an approach also potentially
creates a roadmap for international harmonization in this area.
Part IV surveys the patchwork of laws currently applied to the
regulation of valuable information stored electronically in light of the
framework postulated in Part III. It compares and contrasts the position
in the United States with that in the European Union to demonstrate that
these laws are not only internally incoherent but also are not
harmonized amongst different jurisdictions. This is likely to become a
significant problem in an increasingly global society.
Finally, Part V suggests some directions for future action both
domestically and internationally. The focus here is on the kinds of
questions lawmakers and policymakers should ask to develop
appropriate approaches to regulation of data and information systems in
the information age.
11. Michael J. Madison, Rights of Access and the Shape of the Internet, 44 B.C. L. REV. 433,
442-46 (2003) (distinguishing the information as thing metaphor from the cyberspace as place
metaphor).
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Clearly much is premised here on the assumption that property rights
in valuable information/data are desirable and should be protected by
law. This is a contentious point of view, given the amount of literature
currently arguing against expansive property rights in information and
ideas. 12 As will become apparent from the following discussion, my
own personal stance is that property rights in information are not
necessarily to be avoided if they are monitored appropriately and
controlled by the governments that create them. 13 Such monitoring and
control can be achieved in a variety of ways. This is an issue
I have
14
here.
detail
any
in
arguing
be
not
will
and
elsewhere
canvassed
I mention it, however, because it is fundamental to understanding
why I advocate property rights in information, and because it is
important to point out that I am not suggesting the adoption of
wholesale unfettered property rights that potentially lead to large-scale
monopolies of information. I share the concerns of the commentators
who have criticized the disturbing trend by governments to "overpropertize" information in the digital age. 15 My arguments are
premised on the assumption that governments the world over should
start taking a more balanced view in relation to the regulation of
information property rights than they have in the past; 16 indeed,
governments should take a more active role in monitoring and limiting
commercial exploitation of those rights. I argue that this can be

12. See supra note 10 (citing a sampling of the relevant literature critiquing property rights in
intellectual property).
13. I have argued this previously in relation to property rights in electronic databases.
Jacqueline Lipton, Balancing Private Rights and Public Policies: Reconceptualizing Property in
Databases, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 773 (2003) [hereinafter Lipton, Balancing Private Rights]
(describing ways in which a government can effectively control and monitor any property rights it
grants in electronic databases).
14. Id.; see also Chander, supra note 10, at 778-80 (arguing that property rights in domain
names, like rights in other forms of property, would not result in absolute dominion and can be
limited by law); Jacqueline Lipton, A Frameworkfor Information Law and Policy, 82 OR. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2004) (manuscript on file with author) [hereinafter Lipton, Framework]
(arguing that it is possible to juxtapose various public and private rights in information to achieve
an appropriate policy balance even where extensive information property rights are accepted as a
matter of law); Jacqueline Lipton, Information Property: Rights and Responsibilities, 55 FLA. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2003) (manuscript on file with author) [hereinafter Lipton, Rights and
Responsibilities].
15. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing "over-propertization" in the
information technology setting).
16. Lipton, Balancing Private Rights, supra note 13, at 778-79; Lipton, Rights and
Responsibilities, supra note 14.
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achieved by utilizing the personal property concept as a tool17 to create a
balance between public and private interests in information.
The following discussion focuses on unauthorized incursions, usually
committed by competitors or those who might seek to damage the
commercial reputation and/or potential of an online business. My
suggestions are premised on the idea that "unauthorized" in this context
describes those who intentionally seek to damage the commercial or
economic interests of the possessor of the information.
Legal issues relating to good faith accesses and uses of information
for public purposes, such as scientific and educational purposes, are not
covered here. 18 These are undoubtedly very important issues and to
some extent they cannot really be divorced from the issues addressed in
this Article, as evidenced in the concluding sections of this discussion.
Nonetheless, the aim of this Article is to focus on the types of conduct
that a holder of proprietary information might reasonably complain
about, and for which legal redress should be available.

II. MIXED METAPHORS

IN CYBERSPACE

A. Real Property Versus PersonalPropertyMetaphors
This discussion starts with one basic proposition: regardless of what
anyone has said about the undesirability of incorporating notions of
property into information and information systems, 19 there is no
practical way to avoid this outcome. In dealing with any new issue that
raises legal problems, the human mind will tend to use familiar concepts
to explain and organize the unfamiliar. 20 There are, in fact, distinct

17. Lipton, Balancing Private Rights, supra note 13, at 776; Lipton, Rights and
Responsibilities, supra note 14.
18. There is much literature about the need to preserve what I would term "good faith" uses of
information, including scientific and educational purposes. E.g., David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair
Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 673, 702 (2000) (arguing that
there is a need to preserve fair use exceptions to copyright infringement in the digital age); see
also, e.g., J.H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, Database Protection at the Crossroads: Recent
Developments and Their Impact on Science and Technology, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 793, 83132 (1999) (discussing the need to preserve scientific and technological uses of information in the
wake of the creation of property rights in databases). See generally Yochai Benkler, Free as the
Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74
N.Y.U. L. REv. 354 (1999) (asserting the fair use doctrine in the digital age should be preserved).
19. See supra note 10 (positing the various undesirable manifestations of using property
notions in information technology settings).
20. Hunter, supra note 4, at 444; Madison, supra note 11, at 439.
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advantages to doing so. 2 1 Familiar labels and metaphors can provide
effective and efficient shorthand methods for describing and organizing
new things, and can demonstrate how we, as members of a given
22
society at a given time, feel about a particular new issue.
What is important in the age of information technology is not
whether we use property metaphors to describe and organize laws, but
how we use those metaphors. Arguably, one of the problems with
property metaphors in cyberspace in the past, including the cyberspace
metaphor itself, is the confused way in which they have been used.
Metaphors can be useful tools to simplify a new and complex
problem. 23
Yet, in the context of information and information
technology, property metaphors have been used inconsistently and
imprecisely by courts and commentators, leading to some confusion
about the types of legal rights being created in relevant aspects of
information technology.
As an example, and to echo McLeod's concerns, 24 in cases where
plaintiffs have been concerned about chattel trespass in relation to their
computer systems, connoting a personal property right in the system (or
in electrons flowing through the system), 25 plaintiffs have in fact
26
assumed that they have real-property-like rights in computer systems.
This has led to courts taking inconsistent views about property rights in
information systems. All of the physical aspects of information
systems-hardware, cabling, physical storage devices, and probably
also electrons flowing through the system-may be regarded as
personal property, but they are clearly not real property. Any actual
interference with these items might give rise to a chattel trespass claim,
if the elements of that claim are made out.
Trespass to chattels is a common law tort that deals with
unauthorized use of or intermeddling with another's personal

21. See Alfred C. Yen, Western Frontier or Feudal Society?: Metaphors and Perceptionsof
Cyberspace, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1207, 1209 (2003) (demonstrating how different property
metaphors can help inform regulatory developments in cyberspace).
22. Hunter, supra note 4, at 444; Madison, supra note 11, at 439; Yen, supra note 21, at 1209.
23. Hunter, supra note 4, at 444; Madison, supra note 11, at 439; Yen, supra note 21, at 1209.
24. See supra note I and accompanying text (discussing Australia's approach in drafting tort
legislation in response to information tampering).
25. CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1021 (S.D. Ohio 1997)
(acknowledging that "[ellectronic signals generated and sent by computer have been held to be
sufficiently physically tangible to support a trespass cause of action").
26. Hunter, supra note 4, at 443.
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property. 27 The elements of the tort require that the interference (a) be
intentional, (b) be unauthorized, (c) be substantial, (d) involve actual
harm or serious infringement of rights, and (e) involve physical contact
with the property in question. 28 The tort will only apply to physical,
tangible personal property, as distinct from real property and intangible
intellectual property. 29
Thus, a claim for chattel trespass obviously could be made with
respect to actual physical interference with the hardware aspects of a
computer system. However, the circumstances would have to involve
impairment of the condition, quality, or value of the hardware, 30 or
31
deprivation of the use of the hardware for a substantial period of time.
This would appear to limit the operation of the tort to cases of physical
vandalism.
Even if electrons are regarded as tangible, physical
property, it is hard to imagine substantial interference with electrons
that causes such a result in practice.
Nevertheless, some courts have found chattel trespass claims in
relation to computer systems on the basis of relatively minor amounts of
interference, including electrons flowing through a system and
inconvenience to a plaintiff's customers from unwanted span. 32 In
most of these cases, plaintiffs have been concerned in reality with
defendants making unauthorized incursions into plaintiffs' systems to
gain some kind of commercial advantage. Examples include situations
where a defendant makes unauthorized use of information stored within
a plaintiff's system, such as customer details for targeted marketing
purposes, or information on the plaintiff's available products and
33
services for market research and/or Web aggregation purposes.

27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217 (1965); see also America Online, Inc. v.
LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444, 451-52 (E.D. Va. 1998); R. Clifton Merrel, Trespass to
Chattels in the Age of the Internet, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 675, 677-78 (2002).
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 218(b); Laura Quilter, Briefing Paper, Trespass to
Chattel Doctrine Applied to Cyberspace 1 (2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author),
available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/pubs/annrev/exmplrs/bp/lqbp.pdf (last
visited Oct. 22, 2003).
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 218(b); see also Edward W. Chang, Bidding on
Trespass: eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc. and the Abuse of Trespass Theory in Cyberspace-law,
29 AIPLA Q.J. 445, 447 (2001); Quilter, supra note 28, at 1.
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 218(b).
31. Id.
32. CompuServe Inc., v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1022 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
But see LEMLEY ET AL., supra note 2, at 948 (querying whether this analysis makes sense in
practice).
33. HONGWEI ZHU ET AL., THE INTERPLAY OF WEB AGGREGATION AND REGULATIONS § 2.1
(MIT Sloan Sch. of Mgmt., Working Paper No. 4397-02, 2002) (describing the legal and
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If a plaintiff is truly concerned with a defendant making unauthorized
uses of his or her valuable information, the problem does not
necessarily arise from the fact that the plaintiff feels that he or she
"owns" the website. Rather, it arises from the fact that the law has not
developed sufficiently tailored responses to problems involving
unauthorized uses of valuable information about which the plaintiff may
feel equally proprietarial. To alleviate these concerns, judges might
bend and stretch existing chattel trespass laws to the breaking point to
protect the information under the guise of protecting the sanctity of the
34
website, as if it were a real place.
Many of those who have criticized the use of property metaphors
underlying the application of the chattel trespass doctrine in the
information technology context are not so concerned about the fact that
the metaphors are used, but rather about how those metaphors are
employed. If litigants and courts had made more consistent and precise
uses of property metaphors here, and if chattel trespass claims were
litigated with strict adherence to their constituent elements, the use of
the term "property" in this context would be much less controversial.
Obviously the above oversimplifies the issue somewhat; the real
problems are a little more complex than suggested here. For one thing,
common-law computer trespass is not the most troubling example of the
use of property metaphors in the information age, although it does
exemplify one of the most inconsistent areas of application of law by
courts. Many scholars have been much more concerned about, say,
developments in copyright law that bolster the proprietary quality of
information stored in computer systems 3 5 or developments in sui
generis database law in the European Union. 36 However, these
examples are really more about the information-as-thing 37 metaphor

technological aspects of web aggregation services), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract-id=365061 (last visited Oct. 23, 2003).
34. eBay, Inc. v Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1069-70 (N.D. Cal. 2000);
Quilter, supra note 28, at 5-6.
35. Nimmer, supra note 18, at 683; Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital
Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need To Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 519, 521-22 (1999).
36. Council Directive 96/9/EC of 11 March 1996 on the Legal Protection of Databases, 1996
O.J. (L 77) [hereinafter E.U. Database Directive], available at http://europa.eu.int (last visited
Oct. 25, 2003).
37. Madison, supra note 11, at 446-47 (describing the difference between information as
thing and cyberspace as place metaphors).
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than the cyberspace as place metaphor. 38 Before considering the
former, it is desirable to dispense with the latter.
I chose to commence with the computer trespass example because, in
my view, it is important to start a discussion on the unpacking of these
concepts in the information age with a basic example of how the
confusion between real and personal property rights in information and
information systems arises, so that the real property metaphor can be
firmly set aside. It should satisfy the proprietary impulses of website
operators if they are able to assert personal property rights in their
computer hardware and website contents, provided that any such rights
are appropriately tailored to the overall needs of the global information
society in terms of access to and use of information.
Assuming the exclusion of the real property metaphor for all things
cyber, we are then left with the question of how to use the personal
property metaphor with respect to information and information
technology. No one would doubt that physical aspects of a computer
system can be personal property; they are just another example of a
class of tangible objects that can be physically possessed. The more
vexing question is whether information/data per se should be regarded
as a species of personal property.
B. PersonalProperty in Cyberspace: The Data or the Box?
It is now time to turn this discussion back to the passage quoted at the
beginning of this Article: McLeod's assertion that the Australian
legislature has been missing the forest for the trees by focusing
regulation on computer systems, the boxes or storage devices, rather
than on data or information per se. It seems that there is some merit in
maintaining a clear distinction between the box and the data stored in
the box. There is currently confusion in many jurisdictions about the
difference between focusing laws on protecting boxes, on the one hand,
39
and data stored within the boxes on the other.
Many instances of complaints about unauthorized access to a
computer system are really premised on the complainant's concerns
about unauthorized access to and/or use of data stored within the

38. Id. But see Hunter, supra note 4, at 446-47 ("[L]et me go further and suggest that all
legislators, judges and lawyers unconsciously think that cyberspace is a place, even though at
times they may argue vehemently that it is not.").
39. See supra note 2. Even in jurisdictions where laws are predominantly focused on
protecting data within systems, such as the United Kingdom, there is some confusion about the
boundaries of the legal framework within which this goal is to be realized. The following
discussion considers this issue in more detail.
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system.40 This is another reason why real property metaphors in
cyberspace should be avoided. Where a complainant's concern is really
with unauthorized activities involving its proprietary data, the use of

real property metaphors in relation to its computer system clearly
misleads and does not deal directly with the issue at hand.
There may indeed be some situations in which website operators and
Internet businesses have legitimate concerns about damage to systems
per se. However, these situations do not merit a real property analysis.
Examples might include: (a) distributed denial-of-service attacks; 4 1 (b)
the creation and distribution of computer viruses; 4 2 (c) the use of web
crawling "bots" 4 3 to aggregate information from a variety of websites to
provide information to the public comparing, for example, prices
available for particular products on those sites; 44 and (d) the growing
45
problem of spain e-mails.
As will be demonstrated in the following discussion, although these
activities initially appear to relate to unauthorized access and use of

websites as distinct from their contents, ultimately most of these
examples implicate unauthorized conduct involving contents. In any
event, all of these activities might be annoying, and some of them might

40. McLeod, supra note 1, at 50-51.
41. Distributed denial-of-service
("DDoS") attacks involve unauthorized intruders
commandeering the computers of unsuspecting users and using these distributed systems, referred
to as "zombies," to flood a particular website or service provider with junk messages. These
messages will overwhelm the victim's servers and cause the website to deny service to its
legitimate customers for a period of time. See Stephen E. Henderson & Matthew E. Yarbrough,
Suing the Insecure?: A Duty of Care in Cyberspace, 32 N.M. L. REv. 11, 11 (2002) (stating that
the "Internet can be crippled by distributed denial-of-service attacks launched by relatively
unsophisticated and judgment proof parties"); Margaret Radin, Distributed Denial of Service
Attacks: Who Pays? (Part1), 6(9) CYBERSPACE LAW. 2 (2001).
42. Viruses are small pieces of software programming that piggyback onto real programs.
They run every time the real program runs and reproduce by attaching to other programs,
wreaking havoc in the infected system generally. E-mail viruses replicate by automatically
mailing themselves to dozens of people in a victim's e-mail address book.
See
HOWSTUFFWORKS,
INC.,
How COMPUTER VIRUSES
WORK, at http://computer.
howstuffworks.com/virus.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2003) [hereinafter HOWSTUFFWORKS]
(describing the process by which a computer virus spreads); Yaman Akdeniz, Section 3 of the
Computer Misuse Act 1990: An Antidote for Computer Viruses!, 3 WEB J. CURRENT LEGAL
ISSUES, at http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/1996/issue3/akdeniz3.html (1996) (discussing the United
Kingdom legislation on computer misuse).
43. eBay, Inc. v Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1061-62 (N.D. Cal. 2000)
(discussing a defendant who was using "bots" to aggregate information from various online
auction houses, including plaintiff's website); ZHU ET AL., supra note 33, § 3.2.
44. eBay, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1061-62; ZHU ET AL., supra note 33, § 3.
45. LEMLEY ET AL., supra note 2, at 921-40 (surveying relevant case law and legislative
responses to the increasing problem of span e-mails).
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interfere with an online business' ability to serve its customers. 46
However, it is not clear that the law should proscribe all of them per se
beyond the extent to which they might result in unauthorized access or
47
damage to data.
The immediately obvious items of value to online businesses are their
information products, rather than their physical storage devices or even
(generically) their websites per se. The items of value include (a)

proprietary software; (b) databases of buyers, suppliers, customers,
products, etc.; (c) trademark rights in names, logos, etc., utilized by the

business; (d) Internet domain names; (e) business methods, trade
secrets, know-how, etc.; and (f) website design or layout.

Many of

them already attract some form of intellectual property protection; for
example, proprietary software will attract copyright protection4 8 and, in
some instances, will be patentable. 4 9 Internet domain names usually
correspond to a trademark right and thus are protected ultimately by the
trademark system. 50 Many aspects of electronic databases will be
protected by copyright law, 5 1 although the actual database

46. For example, in a DDoS attack, the attack might cause the victim's system to crash for a
period of time, thus preventing the website operator from providing service to its customers.
Henderson & Yarbrough, supra note 41, at 11; Radin, supra note 41.
47. RONALD MANN & JANE WINN, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 75-76 (2002) (discussing the
possibility of establishing industry standards and practices for computer security rather than
purely relying on legal liability for computer hacking); Mary M. Calkins, They Shoot Trojan
Horses, Don't They? An Economic Analysis of Anti-Hacking Regulatory Models, 89 GEO. L.J.
171, 188-224 (2000) (analyzing various private and public models for preventing unauthorized
computer hacking conduct, including the setting of government standards for computer security
and government-funded education programs to support the standards, rather than relying purely
on legal liability for hacking).
48. LEMLEY ET AL., supra note 2, at 33-94 (detailing the basis upon which various aspects of
software have attracted copyright protection).
49. Patent protection for software was originally a somewhat vexing question. There were
strong arguments made against granting software patents. E.g., John Swinson, Copyright or
Patent or Both? An Algorithmic Approach to Computer Software Protection, 5 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 145, 146 (1991); John Swinson, Software Patents in the United States, 4 J.L. & INFO. SCI.
116, 124-41 (1993). However, over the years, software patents have increasingly been accepted
in the United States, and many commentators advocate their use. See, e.g., Julie Cohen & Mark
Lemley, PatentScope andInnovation in the Software Industry, 89 CAL. L. REv. 1, 4 (2001).
50. Certainly, the Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy ("UDRP") implemented
by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers ("ICANN") relies on the
relationship between domain names and trademarks in ascertaining the difference between good
faith and bad faith domain-name registrations. THE INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED
NAMES AND NUMBERS, UNIFORM DOMAIN-NAME DISPUTE-RESOLUnON POLICY para. 4(a)(i),
(b)(i)-(ii), (iv), at http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm (Oct. 24, 1999).
51. Any original software utilized in the database, such as the search engine program, will be
copyrightable as a literary work. Mary M. Brown et al., Database Protectionin a Digital World,
6 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 2, para. 62, at http:/law.richmond.edu/jolt/v6il/conley.html (1999). The
visual format of the results may also be patentable as an artistic or graphical work. Id.
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contents will not be protected as such, at least in the United
52
States.
The main problem with these existing intellectual property rights in
the context under discussion here is that they have not been created as

part of a cohesive policy framework for information law, 53 and they are
not internationally harmonized, as the following discussion will
demonstrate.
However, such property rights can be useful if

appropriately organized.
C. The Impetus for Information PropertyRights
A personal property concept in information may be particularly
useful if tailored appropriately to meet competing needs for rights in
information generally. The personal property concept has proved useful

in the past in relation to items that have some commercial value and in
which parties desire to trade. 54 Property is obviously a complex
concept and it connotes many things. However, the practical impetus
for describing something as property, rather than adopting some other
characterization, usually comes down to a need to trade in the item. It
tends to be driven by those who seek to develop a market relating to a
specific item. The law then follows the market by creating and
55
supporting the property right in question, either by statute,

52. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361-62 (1991) (holding that to
meet the originality standard for copyright protection a database or compilation needed to show
sufficient originality in the selection or arrangement of its contents). Mere "sweat of the brow" in
compiling a database would be insufficient to attract copyright protection. Id. at 353. The E.U.
Database Directive takes a different approach, as outlined below. See infra notes 142-148 and
accompanying text (describing database protection in the European Union).
53. I have argued elsewhere that it may now be time to think about creating a broader
information law and policy framework for the global information age. Lipton, Framework, supra
note 14.
54. See Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human Body, 80 B.U. L. REV. 359, 364
(2000) (noting that the difference between a privacy right in elements of the human body and a
property right lies in the impetus for trade connoted by the property right); see also Jessica
Litman, Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1295-97 (2000)
(making similar observations in the information property context).
55. In fact, this is how intellectual property rights were created in the first place, by following
the perceived requirements of the market to encourage innovation. See Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985); Steve P. Calandrillo, An Economic
Analysis of Intellectual Property Rights: Justifications and Problems of Exclusive Rights,
Incentives To Generate Information, and the Alternative of a Government-run Reward System, 9
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 301, 304-05 (1998) (discussing economic
considerations of copyright and patent law).
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through the courts, 5 6 or both. 57 Professor Litman has noted, "[t]he
raisond'etre of property is alienability; the purpose of property laws is
to prescribe the conditions for transfer. Property law gives owners
58
control over an item and the ability to sell or license it."

With respect to intellectual property

rights generally,

many

commentators also have pointed to various utilitarian 59 and Lockean
justifications 6° for the grant of such rights by legislatures. 6 1 In terms of

utilitarian justifications, commentators often argue that, absent the grant
of intellectual property rights, there would be insufficient incentives for
people to create artistic and scientific works because of the nonrivalrous, public-goods 62 qualities of such works.
This does not contradict the above point about the impetus for the
creation of property, as opposed to other forms of rights in information
products. Obviously the types of rewards contemplated here are
economic or commercial, meaning the ability to trade with the relevant
56. Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 236-37 (1918) (creating a temporary
"quasi property" right in non-copyrightable news reports).
57. Trade secrets have been recognized as property rights both in legislation and by the courts.
Economic Espionage Act of 1996 § 101, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839 (2000), amended by Criminal
Law Technical Amendments Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-273, § 4002(e)(9), 116 Stat. 1806,
1810; Ruckleshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003--04 (1984).
58. Litman, supra note 54, at 1295.
59.

See Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Are Ideas Within the TraditionalDefinition of Property?:

A JurisprudentialAnalysis, 47 ARK. L. REV. 603, 612-13 (1994) (discussing the utilitarian
justification for intellectual property); Edwin C. Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual Property, 18
PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 31, 47-50 (1989) (containing utilitarian arguments supporting the grant of
intellectual property rights); Tom G. Palmer, Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified? The
Philosophy of Property Rights and Ideal Objects, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 817, 820 (1990)

(noting that utilitarian arguments can both support and refute the need for intellectual property).
60. Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEo. L.J. 287, 297-330 (1988)

(analyzing Lockean justifications for intellectual property rights); Adam D. Moore, A Lockean
Theory of Intellectual Property, 21 HAMLINE L. REV. 65, 66 (1997).

61. Other theories have also been used to explain grants of intellectual property rights. See
Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-expression: Equality and Individualismin the Natural

Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1540-1606 (1993) (outlining natural law
theory of intellectual property rights and the relationship of the right to self expression); Wendy J.
Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the RestitutionaryImpulse, 78 VA. L.

REV. 149 (1992) (outlining a restitutionary model for intellectual property rights at the state
level); Hughes, supra note 60, at 330-56 (outlining a Hegelian "personality" theory of intellectual
property rights).
62. "Public goods" are those goods that can be shared non-rivalrously by many, and from
whose use non-payers are not easily excluded. Wendy J. Gordon, Authors, Publishers, and
Public Goods: Trading Gold for Dross, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 159, 164 (2002). Inventions and

works of authorship are public goods. Id. Their creation is economically stimulated by the
limited private exclusion rights granted under patent and copyright laws. Id.; see also Wendy J.
Gordon, Asymmetric Market Failure and Prisoner's Dilemma in Intellectual Property, 17 U.

DAYTON L. REV. 853, 854 (1992) (discussing conditions where intellectual property rights are
necessary to prevent market failure).
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works in a market.
Other forms of reward could have been
contemplated by the legislature, such as public recognition for the
creation of a scientific or artistic work.63 These forms of reward
presumably would not require a property right per se because they are
not based on economic ideals and the need to encourage commerce with
the works in question. However, even under such a model, it is likely
that at some point someone, be it the creator of the works or someone
else, would want to trade in the works, and a property right would need
to be created to facilitate such trade.
Likewise with the Lockean justification for intellectual property
rights, the basic idea is that people are entitled to enjoy the fruits of their
labors. 64 One who makes the effort to appropriate something from the
commons 65 is entitled to enjoy the benefit of that appropriation,
provided that he leaves "as much and as good" for others6 6 and does not
waste the assets in question. 6 7 This theory obviously was not developed
with intellectual property rights in mind, but often has been used to
justify their grant. 68 The obvious assumption here is that there is a form
69
of "intellectual commons" from which ideas can be appropriated.
As with the utilitarian justification, the benefit granted to the
appropriator under the Lockean analysis takes the form of a property
right rather than some other form of right. Again, we can ask the
question: Why does the right take a property form? Presumably, again,
it forms at least partly because of the desire to trade in an object that has
63. In some ways, this is what moral rights law is about. The United States has very limited
moral rights provisions in its copyright law. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 § 602, 17 U.S.C. §
101 (2000) (creating federal moral rights of attribution and integrity for artists in their work by
recognizing an artist's legally protectable interests in claiming authorship of his or her work and
in the physical integrity of his or her visual art, even after it is sold, for the lifetime of the artist or
author). However, other jurisdictions, including the European Union and Australia, have more
detailed moral rights provisions in their copyright laws. See, e.g., Copyright, Designs and Patents
Act, 1988, c.48, §§ 77-89 (Eng.); Copyright Act, 1968, §§ 189-195 (Austl.).
64. JOHN LOCKE, The Second Treatise of Civil Government, in Two TREATISES OF CIVIL
GOVERNMENT 121, paras. 27-30, at 134-36 (Thomas I. Cook ed., Hafner Publ'g Co. 1947)
(1690).
65. Id. paras. 27, 32. Of course, the application of this idea to information property assumes
that there is a kind of "intellectual commons." R. Anthony Reese, Reflections on the Intellectual
Commons: Two Perspectives on Copyright Duration and Reversion, 47 STAN. L. REV. 707, 71011(1995).
66. LOCKE, supra note 64, para. 36.
67. Id. para. 33.
68. See supra note 60 (citing to works analyzing Lockean theories of intellectual property
rights).
69. Michael J. Madison, Legal-Ware: Contract and Copyright in the Digital Age, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 1025, 1097 (1998) (accepting the premise of an intellectual commons of
information and ideas).
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a market value. The property right can also exclude others from an item
that a person has appropriated from the commons. Thus, the right
serves an important exclusionary function. However, a privacy right
might also serve such a function absent the desire to deal with the item
in a market. 70 Thus, Professor Litman's assertion that property rights
are created when alienability of an item is required seems to be borne
out here.
Given that property rights appear to be particularly useful in the
context of items with which people desire to trade in commerce, it
seems inevitable that the types of information assets described above in
relation to online businesses will ultimately attract a "property" label.
Whether or not courts and legislatures expressly support such a model,
market players will likely treat those items as property, unless the law
rights and trading in a particular item on
expressly prohibits proprietary
71
grounds.
policy
public
Even without a legal "property" label, the market can use other
mechanisms such as contractual provisions and technological measures
to achieve property-like ends. 7 2 Electronic databases are an obvious
example of this. In the United States, databases that are insufficiently
original in the selection or arrangement of their contents to attract
copyright protection do not enjoy legal protection as the property of
their compiler. 7 3 Even those databases that do attract copyright
protection are only protected to the extent of their fixed literal
expression. 74 There are no property rights in their contents.7 5

70. Louis D. Brandeis & Samuel D. Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
198-99 (1890); see also Martin P. Hoffman, The Rights of Publicity and Privacy, in
TRADEMARKS, COPYRIGHTS, AND UNFAIR COMPETITION FOR THE GENERAL PRACTITIONER 227,
229 (A.L.I.-A.B.A. Continuing Legal Educ., SB77, 1997) (discussing the historical basis for
Brandeis and Warren's article).
71. For example, spleen cells and organs and other body parts, such as kidneys, livers, hearts,
lungs, corneas, bone marrow, and skin cannot be sold as products, but can be donated. See Rao,
supra note 54, at 373-74. Endangered species of animals and plants are protected through the
regulation of hunting and trade in those species. See 22 U.S.C. § 2151 (q) (2000).
72. William W. Fisher III, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1203, 1203 (1998); Madison, supra note 11, at 433-34.
73. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361-62 (1991).
74. See STEPHEN ELIAS, PATENT, COPYRIGHT & TRADEMARK: A DESK REFERENCE TO
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW

66 (Lisa Goldoftas ed., Nolo Press 1996) (1941); John R. Dean,

The Sheriff Is Coming to Cyberville: Trademark and Copyright Law and the Internet, 1IBYU J.
PUB. L. 75, 96 (1997).
75. See ELIAS, supra note 74, at 66; Dean, supra note 74, at 96.
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The fact that such databases-as-compilations are not regarded by U.S.
law 76 as property does not stop those who compile them from trading in
them. 77 Technological encryption measures are often utilized to prevent
unauthorized access, and contractual licensing and transfer schemes are
used for commercial transactions involving such databases. 78 Thus, the
market effectively creates a property right where there is an impetus to
deal commercially with the item in question, regardless of the stance a
79
particular legislature might take on the creation of a property right.
In this context, it is futile to argue that legislatures should not
continue to create information property rights. What is more important
is to recognize that the market drives, and will continue to drive, what is
regarded as a property right. The appropriate role of the legislature
should be to monitor and control the use of these rights. 80 This role will
include ensuring that the rights do not: (a) encroach to an unjustifiable
extent on the public domain of information and ideas; 8 1 (b) stifle
invention, education, and creativity throughout society; 82 and (c)
83
interfere with privacy interests in relation to personal information.
Additionally, legislatures should identify precisely what forms of bad
faith unauthorized conduct should be prohibited. It is to those issues
that the remainder of this Article turns. I will present arguments in
favor of creating a unified and cohesive framework for laws dealing
76. Not all jurisdictions follow this model. Australian copyright law does appear to allow
copyright in an unoriginal database. Telstra Corp. v. Desktop Mktg. Sys. Pty Ltd. (2001) 51
I.P.R. 257 (allowing copyright protection for a white pages telephone book compiled
electronically), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/federalct/2001/612.html (last
visited Sept. 27, 2003). This decision has been appealed unsuccessfully to the Full Court of the
Federal Court of Australia and there is currently an appeal pending before the High Court of
Australia. Desktop Mktg. Sys. Pty Ltd. v. Telstra Corp. (2002) 119 F.C.R. 491. The European
Union has created a sui generis property right for unoriginal databases called the E.U. Database
Directive. See infra notes 142-148 and accompanying text (describing database protection in the
European Union).
77. For example, LEXIS, Westlaw, and Bureau for National Affairs (BNA) publications (legal
research databases); Ancestry (fee-based online United States death indexes for genealogy
searches); the Complete Marquis Who's Who (biographies database); DIALOG (leading supplier
on online databases including DATASTAR, DialogWeb, and Profound); eLibrary (access to
periodical database); and eMarketer (detailed market reports).
78. See supra note 77 (listing examples of various indices and databases).
79. As a result, I have argued elsewhere that it would be preferable for the United States
Congress to accept property fights in electronic databases, but to closely monitor the commercial
exploitation of such rights to prevent unjustified monopolies and to protect the public domain of
information and ideas. Lipton, Balancing Private Rights, supra note 13, at 832-33.
80. Id.; Chander, supra note 10, at 771-72.
81. Lipton, Balancing PrivateRights, supra note 13, at 781-82.
82. Id.
83. In respect of balancing property rights in information products against privacy rights in
personal information, see Lipton, Framework, supra note 14.
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with such bad faith unauthorized incursions into commercial
information property rights. Any such framework should be based on
the classes of conduct about which information owners are likely to be
most concerned. These classes of conduct are identified in Part III. Part
IV then examines how these issues are currently dealt with under a
pastiche of laws both within the United States and throughout the
European Union. Part V suggests ways in which these laws could be
presented in terms of a more unified and harmonized theoretical
framework.
III. DAMAGING DIGITAL DATA
Focusing now on the issue of how regulators should approach bad
faith incursions into rights in proprietary information, the first step must
be to identify the types of conduct with which they should be
concerned. Laws and remedies crafted to support rights in information
will be more likely to address the issues about which a complainant is
actually concerned than the more indirect approach of basing legal
sanctions on alleged damage to an information system. There will
naturally be cases where a complainant is concerned about damage to an
information system per se, but these are likely to be straightforward
cases of criminal or tortious damage to the physical aspects of the
system that will not require special new sui generis laws.
There are some more difficult cases where the physical attributes of a
system are not damaged by a wrongdoer and where the information
within the system is not necessarily damaged, but where the
complainant's ability to effectively utilize its system or information
contained therein is compromised. An obvious example of this is a
distributed denial-of-service ("DDoS") attack.
This involves
unauthorized intruders commandeering the computers of unsuspecting
users and using these distributed systems, referred to as "zombies," to
flood a particular website or service provider with junk messages.
These messages will overwhelm the victim's servers and will cause the
website to deny service to its legitimate customers for a period of
84
time.
A DDoS attack does not necessarily involve damage to any physical
system or to any information residing within a system, although it does
interfere with a website operator's ability to provide service to its
customers for a period of time. This may be a unique case requiring

84. Radin, supra note 41; see also Henderson & Yarbrough, supra note 41, at 11-14
(describing how DDoS attacks cripple computer systems).
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specific legislative attention, 85 or it may be that such conduct should not
attract a specific legal sanction where data is not actually damaged or
destroyed as a result of the attack.
For the most part, however, activities that will be of particular
concern to online businesses involve unauthorized interferences with
their proprietary rights in information. Even the activities involving
computer viruses or Web aggregation services, referred to in Part 1,86
can be explained in terms of concerns by the complainant about
unauthorized damage to, access to, and/or distribution of information
contained on its website or within its system. Viruses often damage or
destroy data within a system or copy and forward such information to
other systems. 87 Web aggregators take information from a website and
re-present it in a comparative form on another website. 88 This may not
involve unauthorized access to the information in the first place but
could involve unauthorized use and distribution of the information.
Assuming, then, that the focus of any law aimed at protecting
proprietary information against bad faith incursions should be focused
on the impact of a wrongdoer's conduct on the information per se, the
next step is to identify the types of impacts that should be prohibited.
Most, if not all, bad faith activity in relation to information breaks down
into at least one of four possible categories: (a) unauthorized access to
the information; (b) unauthorized use, including copying and disclosure,
of the information, regardless of whether or not the initial access was
authorized; (c) damage to, or destruction of, the information; and (d)
theft or misappropriation of the information.
These four categories of conduct in relation to information seem to
sum up the concerns of information proprietors in the digital age. They
are not necessarily mutually exclusive; for example, one cannot make
an unauthorized use of proprietary information unless one has first
accessed the information, although in any given case access may be
authorized while subsequent use is not. There is also obviously a close
In some
relationship between access and misappropriation.
circumstances, such as misappropriation of a trade secret, the two may,

85. Radin, supra note 41; see also Henderson & Yarbrough, supra note 41, at 19 (describing,
as an example, proposed security legislation for the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996).
86. See supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text (enumerating types of unauthorized
activities that raise website operators' concerns regarding damage to systems per se).
87.
88.

HoWSTUFFWORKS, supra note 42.
See generally ZHU ET AL., supra note 33, § 3 (discussing the issues arising as a result of

this aggregation).
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in fact, amount to the same thing. 89 Nonetheless, it is worth separating
the two concepts for the purposes of this discussion on the assumption
that misappropriation arguably involves more than mere access, as some
of the following examples will demonstrate.
As noted above, even concerns about viruses and Web aggregators
can be explained in terms of the above categories of conduct. 90 In fact,
even the difficult-to-address area of DDoS attacks might be explained in
terms of damage to or destruction of information, if that category were
interpreted as being broad enough to encompass damage to a
complainant's (or its customers') ability to access and use its own
information. Perhaps this sounds far-fetched, but the generic concern
about damage to or destruction of information is premised largely on the
loss of the owner's ability to use the information. As with damage or
destruction of a tangible, physical asset, the owner's concern is with
deprivation of the asset by the wrongdoer. A DDoS attack effectively
deprives the owner of the relevant assets, at least temporarily.
An owner of property rights in information obviously wants to exert a
significant degree of control over the item in question 9 1 and to generate
profits from utilizing the item in commerce. An owner's control might
take the form of licensing the information, selling it, utilizing it as
collateral for a loan, 9 2 etc. In order to preserve the ability to utilize the
item in these ways, an owner's control of the item must extend to the
ability to limit access to the item and exclude others from using it.
Otherwise, there would be no potential to license or transfer it for
valuable consideration as others could simply take it free of charge.
The owner must also be able to guard against unauthorized uses and/or
disclosures of the information that might impact the information's value
negatively, again by increasing its general availability.
Owners of proprietary information will also want to guard against
damage to or destruction of the information for the reasons set out
89. The possibility of access and misappropriation being the same is taken up in greater detail
in Part IV.
90. See supra text accompanying and following note 86 (noting damage and distribution of
information concerns).
91.

See Lipton, Framework,supra note 14.

92. This is a more unusual use of information property, but commentators have been
suggesting ways in which security may be asserted over cyber-age information assets. See Alice
Haemmerli, Insecurity Interests: Where Intellectual Property and Commercial Law Collide, 96

COLUM. L. REV. 1645, 1651-52 (1996) (noting examples of major bankruptcies and creations of
new deals where investments were secured by intangible, copyrighted assets); Xuan-Thao
Nguyen, IntellectualProperty Financing:Security Interests in Domain Names and Web Contents,

8 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 489, 490 (2002) (arguing that, without perfected security interests
under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, lenders and investors will lose security rights
in online, intangible assets when bankruptcies occur).
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above. Property owners require protection against those who would
deprive them of their proprietary rights, whether or not the wrongdoer
actually profits from the deprivation.
The same may be true of theft or misappropriation of information.
Property owners will seek legal sanctions against such conduct because
it potentially deprives them of their property, whether or not it benefits
another. In the information property context, theft or misappropriation
can work differently than it does in the physical world because of
information's non-rivalrous 93 quality. Because information can exist in
more than one place at the same time, a policy decision must be made as
to whether theft or misappropriation in this context necessarily connotes
a physical deprivation of the information, or rather a taking of the
information in the sense of "copying." In other words, can there be
misappropriation of information if the initial owner is not deprived of
the information per se, but the value of the information is eroded
because it is now available from more than one source? The latter is
more likely and representative of trade secret law in relation to
94
unauthorized misappropriations of information.
Thus, concerns with the four categories of unauthorized conduct all
really amount to the need to achieve at least one of two possible
outcomes: (a) the preservation of the commercial value of the
information in the hands of its owner, and/or (b) the preservation of the
information per se in the hands of its owner.
Concerns about unauthorized access, use, and misappropriation are
all premised on the first outcome-the preservation of the commercial
value of the item by maintaining its scarcity in the market. The concern
about unauthorized damage or destruction of the item is based more
squarely on the premise of preserving the actual information per se in
the hands of its owner.
Clearly, it is now possible to suggest a framework for the protection
of information property rights against unauthorized bad faith intrusions
organized around the four activities described above for the policy
reasons also detailed above. Part IV illustrates that the current pastiche
of laws in the United States and the European Union protecting
information actually does contemplate prohibitions against most of
these activities and for these reasons. The current laws simply are not

93. See supra note 62 (describing how information can be a "public good" (meaning
information can be shared easily among many people at the same time)).
94. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2) (amended 1985) (defining "misappropriation" of a
trade secret without requiring a deprivation of the original owner's access to his own

information).

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 35

organized in a cohesive way that clearly exemplifies the public policy
basis for protecting information in these ways.
Part IV suggests that by focusing on these types of conduct and the
underlying policies behind their prohibition, we can create a more
transparent and internally cohesive set of laws relating to unauthorized
dealings with information property. This may help lawmakers and
policymakers respond more appropriately to issues involving such
conduct. It may also assist with the important matter of international
harmonization of laws relating to information property, an issue that
will only increase in importance as society and commerce become more
global.
IV. A PATCHWORK OF INFORMATION PROPERTY LAWS
This Part examines the current legal frameworks in the United States
and the European Union regarding unauthorized access, use, damage or
destruction to, and theft or misappropriation of valuable information. It
demonstrates that it is indeed possible to take these four categories of
unauthorized conduct as the basis of a legal and policy framework to
organize and explain social and commercial attitudes to unauthorized
dealings with valuable proprietary information.
The examples
described below come from various areas of law. To date, no coherent
attempt has been made at creating a unifying framework for these areas
to ensure that the relevant categories of conduct, in relation to different
kinds of valuable information, are treated in a harmonized fashion.
The examples presented in this Part are not necessarily
comprehensive, but they are some of the most obvious areas in which
laws have been created in a piecemeal fashion to address unauthorized
dealings with various types of valuable information. The three types of
potentially valuable information addressed in the following discussion
are (a) trade secrets and business methods, (b) valuable software
(copyrighted and/or patented), and (c) unoriginal databases. 95 These
examples have been chosen as some of the most obvious information
products that may constitute key valuable assets of an online business.

95. "Unoriginal databases" in the sense that they are not sufficiently unique for copyright
protection. See generally Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991)
(concluding that factual compilations of telephone numbers, or other unprotectable data, can only
be original for copyright protection if the arrangement of the data is sufficiently unique and not an
organizational method commonly employed by others working with that data).
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A.

The United States Position

Table 1 (below) summarizes the U.S. legal position in relation to
unauthorized access, use, damage or destruction, and theft or
misappropriation of these items. A similar table is provided in Part
IV.B in relation to the European Union position on these activities.
Table 1:

United States Law on Unauthorized Dealings with
Valuable Information Products

Unauthorized Unauthorized Damage or
Access
Use
Destruction
Trade Secrets/ Unauthorized Unauthorized Some
Business
Methods

Software
(copyrighted)

Software
(patented)

Theft or
Misappropriation
Civil and

criminal
liability under
Uniform
Trade Secrets
Act and
Electronic
Espionage
Act,
respectively
Digital
No obvious
No obvious
sanction under sanction
Millennium
Copyright
copyright law; unless the
Act: civil and
may be
software is
criminal
indirect
also protected
penalties for
sanctions
by trade
unauthorized
under chattel secrecy (see
access
trespass law or above)
Computer
Fraud and
Abuse Act
No legal
Patent Act
No obvious
No obvious
patent law
patent law
prohibits
sanction:
access is
unauthorized sanction,
sanction; not
permitted;
use subject to although may possible to
patent
some defenses be civil and
"steal" an
recorded in
criminal
invention that
public register
liability for
has already
damage or
been patented;
destruction of unauthorized
actual data or use will attract
patent
system
sanction
uploading and
downloading
of trade
secrets are
offenses under
federal
Electronic
Espionage Act

use and
disclosure
prohibited
under
Uniform
Trade Secrets
Act and
Electronic
Espionage Act
Sanctions
depend on
type of use;
copying will
not be allowed
without
authorization
unless fair use
defense
applies

prohibitions
under
Electronic
Espionage Act
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Unoriginal
Databases
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Unauthorized
Access
No statutory
sanction, but
may be action
for breach of
contractual
license

Unauthorized
Use
No statutory
sanction, but
may be action
for breach of
contractual
license

Damage or
Destruction
No obvious
direct
sanction; may
be indirect
sanctions
under chattel
trespass law or
Computer
Fraud and
Abuse Act
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Theft or
Misappropriation
No obvious
statutory
sanction
unless
database
contents are
protected by
trade secrecy
(see above);
may be breach
of contractual
license

1. Trade Secrets in the United States
Some explanation of Table 1 is necessary for those who are
unfamiliar with one or more of the laws described therein. Most of the
relevant legal sanctions for unauthorized dealings with trade secrets in
the United States are found in the Uniform Trade Secrets Act and the
Economic Espionage Act. 96 There are some significant differences
between the two legislative schemes, which lead to some gaps in
relation to legal sanctions for specific types of conduct.
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act is a model state law that deals with
civil sanctions, such as injunctions 97 and awards of damages, 98 for
misappropriations 99 of trade secrets. 10 0 A "misappropriation" is 1an
02
unauthorized "acquisition" 10 1 or an unauthorized "disclosure or use"
of a trade secret. These prohibitions would apply to the unauthorized
10 5
access, 10 3 unauthorized use, 104 and theft or misappropriation
categories of conduct suggested above as building blocks for a

96. Economic Espionage Act of 1996 § 101, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1832 (2000).
97. UNiF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2.
98. Id. § 3.
99. Id. § 1(2) (defining "Misappropriation").
100. Id. § 1(4) (defining "Trade Secret").
101. Id. § 1(2)(i).
102. Id. § 1(2)(ii).
103. Here the assumption is made that unauthorized acquisition of a trade secret is tantamount
to unauthorized access as outlined supra text accompanying note 89.
104. Unauthorized use is clearly and expressly prohibited in the definition of
misappropriation. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2)(ii).
105. Theft or misappropriation is clearly contemplated in the definition of "misappropriation."
Id. § 1(2). See in particular § 1(2)(i) on unauthorized "acquisition" of a trade secret.
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framework for protecting proprietary information against unauthorized
bad faith incursions. However, there is no clear sanction under the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act for damaging or destroying a trade secret.
The Economic Espionage Act, on the other hand, provides legal
sanctions for all four categories contemplated above: (a) unauthorized
access, 106 (b) unauthorized use, 10 7 (c) damage or destruction of a trade
secret, 10 8 and (d) theft or misappropriation of a trade secret.1 0 9 The
Economic Espionage Act is limited in a number of ways by
constitutional limitations on federal legislative power. Notably, the
offenses are limited to situations in which the wrongdoer either: (a)
intends that the offense will benefit a foreign government, foreign
instrumentality, or foreign agency; 110 or (b) intends to convert a trade
secret related to, or included in, a product that is produced for, or placed
in, interstate or foreign commerce.1 11 The act is also limited to criminal
sanctions. Thus, there is no power under the legislation for individual
complainants to take direct civil action against a wrongdoer.
The trade secret example illustrates that the laws have indeed focused
on the classes of conduct identified above as constituting a potential
framework for the protection of information property rights. However,
because of the federal constitutional balance and the fact that no one has
necessarily considered the broader problem of protecting information
property rights through the lens of a clear and cohesive policy
framework more generally, some gaps have appeared in the legislation.
For example, there is no direct individual civil remedy available for a
complainant who has had a trade secret damaged or destroyed by a
wrongdoer, although a federal criminal prosecution may be possible in
some circumstances.
As noted in the Introduction, if a trade secret resides in a digital
information system, currently there may be actions available under the
common law of chattel trespass or under the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act ("CFA") for interference with a computer system that damages a
trade secret contained therein. This Article, however, argues in favor of
focusing information property laws more directly on information per se,
rather than on systems within which information may be stored. If the
complainant's concern is with economic loss caused by damage to or
106. Economic Espionage Act of 1996 § 101, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831(a)(2), 1832(a)(2) (2000)
(making it a criminal offense to download or upload a trade secret without authorization).
107. Id. (making it a criminal offense to copy, photograph, alter, transmit, etc., a trade secret).
108. Id. (making it an offense to destroy a trade secret without a requirement of "damage").
109. Id. §§ 1831(a)(1), 1832(a)(1).
110. Id. § 1831(a).
111. Id. § 1832(a).
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destruction of a trade secret, then there should be a law that deals
directly with that issue. This is where a clear and cohesive policy
framework for protecting information property rights may be useful.
2. Software in the United States
The second and third rows of Table 1 deal with unauthorized
interferences with various intellectual property rights in computer
software. The Table does not take into account the fact that valuable
proprietary software can also acquire protection from contractual and
technological protection measures, although these are clear
112
possibilities.
In terms of intellectual property protection, both copyright and patent
laws deal predominantly with unauthorized uses of the property in
question.
Copyright law is concerned largely with unauthorized
reproduction of the work, 1 13 and patent law is concerned with
1 14
unauthorized use and commercial exploitation of the invention.
Neither copyright law nor patent law traditionally has been concerned
with unauthorized access to a work per se. However, in recent years the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act 1 5 ("DMCA") has legally bolstered
the effect of technological protection measures that seek to restrict or
116
prevent access to a copyright work.
Copyright and patent laws also have not focused specifically on
unauthorized damage or destruction, or theft or misappropriation.
Again, if the copyrighted or patented software resides in a digital
information system and a wrongdoer gains unauthorized access to the
system for the purposes of, or with the effect of, damaging or
misappropriating the software, remedies may be available to the
complainant under the law of computer trespass 117 and/or under the
112. Fisher, supra note 72, at 1203 (predicting that producers of intellectual property products
suitable for distribution on the Internet will increasingly rely on contractual and technological
protection measures rather than simple intellectual property rights to protect their interests in
relevant digital products); id. at 1211 (setting forth the possibility of using contract and
technology to create a more generous set of property rights for a digital product holder than
intellectual property law alone would provide).
113.

BRUCE A. LEHMAN, INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE:

THE REPORT OF THE

WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 63--64 (1995).

114. Id. at 155.
115. Digital Millennium Copyright Act § 103, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205 (2000).
116. The DMCA basically prevents the circumvention of technological protection measures
that restrict access to a copyrighted work and the trafficking in devices that facilitate such
circumvention. Id. § 1201.
117. See CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp 1015, 1021-23 (S.D. Ohio
1997).
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CFA. Again, however, these laws often tend to focus on unauthorized
access to a system rather than dealing more directly with concerns about
damage to software stored within a system.
Again, this might be an area where focusing policy debates squarely
on the need to restrict unauthorized conduct in relation to proprietary
information would provide a clearer framework. Currently, the DMCA
deals with access rather than use. This is a very uncharacteristic focus
for copyright law, which traditionally deals with prohibited and
permitted uses of a work, rather than with the ability to access a work.
A more cohesive framework may help to streamline approaches to
unauthorized access to, and use of, information.
3.

Databases

The fourth row of Table 1 deals with the increasingly vexing question
of property rights in databases that are not necessarily sufficiently
original in the selection or arrangement of their contents to attract
copyright protection. 118 This may be the majority of valuable digital
databases, as their value tends to lie in their comprehensiveness and
unselectiveness. 119
Likewise, their arrangement tends not to be
particularly original as the contents are usually input and stored in
standard formats and accessed through the use of search engines.
A number of bills have been drafted in an attempt to create sui
generis proprietary protection for databases in the United States, 120 but
Congress has not yet enacted anything satisfactory. A significant
impetus for drafting these bills was that the European Union created
12 1
such legislation under the auspices of the E.U. Database Directive,
and there was initial concern that if the United States did not follow
suit, American businesses might be disadvantaged vis-A-vis their
122
European Union counterparts.
There are a number of reasons why legislation in the United States
has not yet materialized in final form. The reason for the delay relates
in part to timing and legislative priorities. Yet, there have also been
118. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991); see also supra note
95 and accompanying text (defining unoriginal databases).
119. Brown et al., supra note 51, para. 61 (discussing when electronic databases qualify for
copyrights).
120. E.g., Collections of Information Antipiracy Act, H.R. 354, 106th Cong. (1999);
Consumer and Investor Access to Information Act of 1999, H.R. 1858, 106th Cong. (1999); see
also Lipton, Balancing Private Rights, supra note 13, at 803-05 (describing U.S. congressional
attempts at creating database protection).
121. E.U. Database Directive, supra note 36.
122. Julie Wald, Legislating the Golden Rule: Achieving Comparable Protection Under the
European DatabaseDirective, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 987, 1027 (2002).
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significant concerns expressed about drafting a law that strikes an
appropriate balance between protecting proprietary rights in databases
23
and preserving sufficient good faith access to database contents. 1
As noted in the Introduction, it is important for Congress to clearly
identify and protect appropriate good faith uses of relevant information
and bolster legal protections against bad faith conduct when granting
information property rights. Although this Article is focused on

restricting such bad faith conduct, it is important to appreciate that the
arguments

presented

here

do

not

advocate

commodification of information products.

a

general

over-

Any laws that protect

information property rights should do so in a balanced manner and
should limit and restrict bad faith activities that would damage
information property holders' interests; they should also do so while

preserving socially appropriate
good faith uses of information, such as
124
law.
copyright
in
use
fair
Given that there is no specific statutory property right in databases in
the United States, other than the protection for original selection and
formatting provided under copyright law, 125 there are clearly no direct
legal sanctions for unauthorized access, unauthorized use, damage, or
misappropriation of database contents per se. Private sanctions may be
imposed by contract law, and indirect sanctions may arise in terms of
laws that restrict or prohibit unauthorized interference with a computer
system. 126 Nonetheless, for the reasons detailed above, 127 this approach
is not completely satisfactory.
There are no clear and cohesive
sanctions for unauthorized dealings involving proprietary databases. If
a sui generis database law does arise in the United States, it will deal

123. Good faith uses might include uses of data for scientific, technological, and educational
purposes. See Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 18, at 831-32 (postulating the need to preserve
educational and scientific uses of information in the wake of the creation of private property
rights in databases). Teaching and educational purposes may also be relevant here. See
Copyright and Rights in Databases Regulations, (1997) SI 1997/3032 § 20(1)(b) (Eng.) (allowing
an exception for the use of database contents only for educational and research purposes).
124. Fair use is a limitation on the exclusive rights of a copyright holder. The doctrine is
intended to balance the copyright holder's proprietary rights in a work against allowing certain
uses, such as criticism, commentary, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research. Whether
a particular use is a fair use requires balancing at least four factors: (1) commercial uses versus
non-profit educational uses; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work, such as whether it is
unpublished, factual, or fictitious; (3) the quantity of the work being copied; and most
importantly, (4) the economic effect of the use. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000); see also LEHMAN, supra
note 113, at 73-80.
125. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991).
126. For example, chattel trespass laws and relevant provisions of the CFA.
127. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text (explaining the shortcomings of the
chattel trespass approach).
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with some aspects of such unauthorized dealings. A glimpse at the
European Union law (below) might suggest how this could be done,
although the European Union approach has not gone without its
critics. 128
Importantly, the development of a law and policy framework that
organizes our thinking about how the law should respond generally to
unauthorized incursions into information property rights could be an
important step in creating an appropriate sui generis database law for
the United States. Such a framework could help to identify and isolate
the types of bad faith conduct about which database producers might
reasonably be concerned. It also might organize appropriate legal
responses to those concerns in the context of larger concerns about
protecting the integrity of information property rights more generally.
B. The European Union Position
As in the United States, legislatures throughout the European Union
have grappled with problems relating to the protection of various
classes of information property rights against unauthorized access, use,
damage or destruction, and theft or misappropriation. Some of the
relevant laws are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2: European Union Law on Unauthorized Dealings with
Valuable Information Products

Unauthorized
Access
Trade Secrets/ Law varies
among
Business
Member
Methods

Unauthorized
Use
Law varies
among
Member

Damage or
Destruction
Law varies
among
Member

Theft or
Misappropriation
Law varies
among
Member

States; English States; English States; where

States; English

law based on

the informa-

law based on

tion is not

"relationships

"relationships

law based on

"relationships

of confidence" of confidence" property, as in of confidence"
in contract and in contract and England, there in contract and
equity

equity

may be no

equity

obvious
remedy

128. Catherine Colston, Sui Generis DatabaseRight: Ripe for Review?, 2001(3) J. INFO. L. &
TECH., at http://elj.warwick.ac.uk/jilt/01-3/colston.html; Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 10,
at 77-80, 83-84.
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Software
(copyrighted)

Unauthorized
Access
E.U.
Copyright
Directive, Art.
6 prevents
circumventing
a technological protection
measure to
access a
copyright
workl2 9

Software
(patented)

No legal
sanction.
Access is
permitted;
patent
recorded in
public
registers

Unoriginal
Databases

No obvious
legal remedy,
although may
be contractual
restrictions on
access to a
particular
database

Unauthorized
Use
Copyright
legislation in
most Member
States will
prohibit
reproduction
or copying
without
authorization,
unless a
defense like
fair use
applies
Member
States' patent
laws will
prohibit
unauthorized
uses

Unauthorized
"extraction"
and
"reutilization"
of substantial
part of
database
contents are
prohibited
under the
Database
Directive

Damage or
Destruction
No obvious
direct sanction
other than
perhaps tort
law sanctions
for chattel
trespass
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Theft or
Misappropriation
No obvious
direct sanction
other than
perhaps tort
law sanctions
for conversion
or misappropriation.

No obvious
patent law
sanction,
although may
be civil and
criminal
liability for
damage or
destruction of
actual data or
system

No obvious
patent law
sanction; not
possible to
"steal" an
invention that
already has
been patented;
unauthorized
use will attract
patent
sanction
No sanction
Unauthorized
under
"extraction"
Database
and
Directive, but "reutilization"
since the
of substantial
database right part of
is a personal
database
property right, contents are
there might be prohibited
a tort action in under the
chattel
Database
trespass
Directive

129. Council Directive 2001/29/EC of 22 May 2001 on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects
of Copyright and Related Rights in Information Society, 2001 O.J. (L 167) [hereinafter E.U.
Copyright Directive], available at http://europa.eu.int. This provision is much like the DMCA in
the United States. It has proved controversial in some European Union Member States and has
not been implemented yet into domestic law in the United Kingdom (as of May 5, 2003), despite
the passing of the deadline for implementation in December 2002.
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There are many obvious similarities between Table 2 and Table 1.
The points of distinction between the two relate mainly to trade secrets
and unoriginal databases. These differences do not necessarily evidence
a divergence of underlying approaches to the protection of
commercially valuable information generally, as the following
discussion demonstrates.
It is important to recognize that Table 2 differs from Table 1 in that
many of the relevant issues in the European Union are covered under
individual laws of Member States and not under legislation enacted in
compliance with a European Union directive. 130
This does not
necessarily mean that these laws are not well harmonized. In fact,
intellectual property laws are generally relatively well harmonized
throughout the European Union, at least in theory. 13 1 Table 2,
therefore, refers to things like "Member States' patent laws." This is
unavoidable, as it is beyond the scope of this Article to investigate all
the individual Member States' specific laws relating to information
property rights.
In fact, the comparison illustrates what has largely been the major
problem with legislating to protect the integrity of commercially
valuable information property rights in both the United States and the
European Union to date. Previous approaches have taken a case-bycase approach to legislation, focusing on a specific class of information
asset. Thus, there are laws relating to trade secrets and laws relating to
unoriginal databases. There has been no overall framework for laws
that protect the integrity of valuable commercial information generally.
Such an approach arguably might help to better organize and,
ultimately, harmonize laws relating to information property rights by
clarifying their underlying policy objectives.
1. Trade Secrets in the European Union
It is. not surprising that the United States and the European Union
laws diverge on trade secrets and databases. In the case of trade secrets,
the United States arguably has much more well developed laws than

130. A European Union Directive must be implemented into domestic law by all European
Union Member States, usually within two years of the finalizing of the Directive. The point is to
ensure that Member States' laws harmonize on the points covered in the Directive. For more
detail on the legislative and other processes of the European Union, refer to http://europa.eu.int.
131. Much of the European Union law on traditional intellectual property fights and some new
sui generis rights are based on a combination of World Intellectual Property Organization
("WIPO") treaties and European Union Directives.
Although there are differences of
interpretation amongst European Union Member States, the basic principles of intellectual
property law are relatively well harmonized.
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most other jurisdictions.
The United States is one of the only
jurisdictions in the world, if not the only one, that has enacted specific
trade secret legislation, as opposed to leaving the issue of trade secret
protection to the common law. 132 This position is reflected in the first
row of Table 2, which takes, by way of example, the English 'trade
secret' law, largely based on contract and equity principles. English
courts can impose sanctions for misuse or misappropriation of a
commercial confidence. 13 3 However, the sanction emerges from a
contractual 134 and/or equitable relationship between the parties 135 and
36
not from a proprietary interest in the information in question. 1
The United States, on the other hand, has recognized clear proprietary
rights in valuable trade secrets. 137 The judiciary 138 and both state and
federal legislatures 139 have recognized these property rights. Yet, this
fact alone does not mean that the U.S. and English legal systems are not
doing very similar things in practice when they protect trade secrets.
Professor Raymond Nimmer has provided a useful analysis of the U.S.
approach to trade secret protection that may assist with this comparison:
Describing a [trade] secret as a form of property is particularly useful
in analyzing the circumstances under which trade secrets can be
conveyed through a license, assignment, or sale ....
However,
describing a trade secret as property can create misleading inferences.
The idea of property is itself ambiguous. Describing something as a
property right often means that the owner has a legal right to exclude
all others from using or exercising control over the property. For
traditional types of property, this view has numerous exceptions; for
trade secrets, the exceptions also define the general rule.
In trade secrecy, the right to exclude others depends on the secrecy
maintained by the owner of the secret and by the confidentiality he or
132. This is the position taken in jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom and Australia. See
W.R. CORNISH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS, COPYRIGHT, TRADE MARKS AND ALLIED

RIGHTS, IN 8-06 to 8-09 (4th ed. 1999) (describing the equitable and contractual basis for the
breach of confidence action in the United Kingdom); JILL MCKEOUGH & ANDREW STEWART,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN AUSTRALIA, IT 3.4-3.8 (2d ed. 1997) (describing equitable and
contractual basis for the breach of confidence action in Australia).
133. CORNISH, supra note 132, 8-10 (noting that sanctions are also available for misuse or
misappropriation of technical, personal, and other information).
134. Id. 1 8-06.
135. Id.
136. Id. 11 8-49 to 8-53.
137. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984).
138. Id.
139. Economic Espionage Act of 1996 § 101, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839 (2000), amended by
Criminal Law Technical Amendments Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-273, § 4002(e)(9), 116 Stat.
1806, 1810.
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she imposes on those to whom the secret is revealed. Trade secret law
conveys no exclusive rights independent of these factors. Therefore, it
does not preclude independent discovery and subsequent use. The
proprietary rights in a trade secret are linked to the legal concepts of
misappropriation and breach of confidential relationships. The
property interest arises through and is defined by the legal system's
willingness to enforce such relationships.
Thus, when a trade secret is described as property, that is not to say
that there is a property interest in the information such as could be
enforced against the world at large. Rather, the value lies in the
information and the network of secrecy and confidentiality agreements
created around it by its "owner." U.S. law is willing to protect that
value. 140
I have included this quote at length because it illustrates two
important points about trade secret protection that are relevant to this
discussion. The first is that Professor Nimmer illustrates the importance
of the property metaphor when dealing with an item with which one
wants to deal in commerce. He suggests that the importance of
accepting as property something that might not otherwise fall within
more traditional definitions of property lies in the usefulness of that
characterization for thinking about commercial transactions involving
licensing, sale, other forms of assignment, etc.
Professor Nimmer's suggestion supports the arguments presented in
Part II.C about the importance of lawmakers and policymakers
accepting property rights in valuable information because that is what
the market will demand regardless of the level of support it receives
from the law. 14 1 It makes sense for the law to reflect societal attitudes
in this respect, provided that law and policy makers are alert to prevent
the over-propertization of information, beyond what might reasonably
be expected in society and commerce.
Professor Nimmer's comments also emphasize the underlying
similarities between the American and English approaches to trade
secret protection. Despite the fact that English legislatures and courts
have not accepted a property label for valuable trade secrets, they have
protected the integrity of those secrets in much the same way as
legislatures and courts have in the United States. Under both systems,
protection is really being extended to the owner's efforts to keep the
information secret by imposing obligations of confidence on those to

140. 1 RAYMOND T. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY: RIGHTS, LICENSES,
LIABILITIES § 3.3 (3d ed. 1997) (footnote omitted).
141. See supra Part II.C (explaining the motivations for creating property rights-specifically
that legislators tend to follow market needs in establishing property rights).

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 35

whom the information might be disclosed, and perhaps also by taking
other measures, such as utilizing encryption devices.
Thus, despite Professor Nimmer's suggestion that trade secrets are
not really property in the sense that they are not theoretically
enforceable against the world at large, it may be that as laws and
technologies have developed to meet market expectations, such secrets
are now enforceable in this way. An example would be a company that
stores its valuable information electronically, preventing access to the
information by the use of strong encryption measures and imposing
strict contractual obligations of confidence on anyone to whom the
information is disclosed. Thus, despite the technical differences in legal
approach between the United States and some other jurisdictions
regarding the protection of valuable trade secrets against unauthorized
accesses and uses, the underlying policy concerns are very similar.
2. Databases in the European Union
As noted above, the second major point of distinction between Table
1 and Table 2 relates to protecting unoriginal databases against
unauthorized interference. Here, the difference between the United
States and the European Union is more striking than in the case of trade
secrets.
U.S. law provides no distinct proprietary protection for
databases that are insufficiently original in the selection or arrangement
of their contents to attract copyright protection. 142 Even those databases
that do attract copyright protection will only attract copyright in the
literal expression of that original selection or arrangement, not in the
contents per se. 143 The same result on copyrightable databases follows
in the European Union. European Union Member States have preserved
copyright protection in literal expressions of databases where the
selection or arrangement of their contents is original for copyright
purposes. 144
On the other hand, database producers have expressed concerns about
proprietary protections for their database contents as opposed to the
literal expression of those contents. 145 In the European Union, these

142. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 362-64 (1991).
143. As noted above, copyright will only protect the literal expression of a compilation and
not its contents. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
144. E.U. Database Directive, supra note 36, art. 3(1).
145. JUSTIN HUGHES, POLITICAL ECONOMIES OF HARMONIZATION: DATABASE PROTECTION
AND INFORMATION PATENTS 10-51 (Cardozo Law School, Public Law Research Paper No. 47,
July 8, 2002) (discussing the political and market forces behind the debates on database
protection legislation in the United States and in other jurisdictions), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=318486 (last visited Oct. 12, 2003).
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concerns led to the drafting of the E.U. Database Directive. 14 6 This
created a new class of sui generis property rights in databases based on
the substantial efforts of their compilers. 14 7 As Table 2 demonstrates,
rethis new property right prohibits the unauthorized extraction and/or
14 8
contents.
database's
protected
a
of
part
substantial
a
utilization of
These prohibitions probably map onto the unauthorized use and
An
misappropriation categories of conduct described above.
"extraction" is arguably a misappropriation, and a "re-utilization" would
clearly be a use. Thus, there is no direct prohibition under the E.U.
Database Directive for unauthorized access or for damage or destruction
to the contents of a protected database.
Access may be prohibited through the use of restrictive contractual
provisions and encryption measures as in the United States. Damage or
destruction may also be captured as a result of the individual Member
14 9
State laws that prohibit unauthorized access to a computer system,
much along the lines of the U.S. computer trespass action or the
prohibitions on unauthorized access under the CFA. 150 In fact, access
to the data per se also may be prohibited indirectly under provisions
barring access to the system in which the data is stored. However, as
noted above, if what we are really concerned about in the modern digital
age is damage to data per se, our laws should reflect this concern more
clearly and directly.
There is a clear expectation by those who compile valuable databases
that they "own" proprietary or quasi-proprietary rights in those
databases. Whether there are clear statutory property rights, as in the
European Union, 15 1 or market-driven contractual rights, as in both the
United States and the European Union, database producers are clearly
asserting some form of proprietary right in a valuable information
product.
The question for lawmakers and policymakers is how best to protect
database producers from bad faith incursions, while preserving good
faith access to database contents. The second part of this equation-the
protection of good faith access such as fair use type activities in
146. Id. at 18-27 (discussing E.U. Database Directive).
147. E.U. Database Directive, supra note 36, art. 7(1).
148. Id.
149. Interestingly, the Computer Misuse Act, 1990, c. 18, § 3 (Eng.), does not contemplate
damage or destruction of data as an offense punishable under the statute. However, preventing or
hindering access to data is an offense. Id. § 3(2)(b).
150. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §1030(a)(5)(A) (2000) (contemplating penalties for the damage or
destruction of data stored within a federal computer system).
151. E.U. Database Directive, supra note 36, art. 7(1).
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copyright law-is beyond the scope of this Article, although scholars
152
have discussed it in detail elsewhere.
Assuming that this part of the equation can be addressed adequately
by legislators, 153 the other part of the equation relates to streamlining
and harmonizing the approach to organizing those aspects of the law
that will actually prohibit unauthorized bad faith incursions into the
information property contained in valuable databases. In this Article, I
suggest that legislators should consider this question in the context of a
broader "information property" policy framework that focuses on
protecting all forms of valuable information property against bad faith
access, use, damage or destruction, and misappropriation.
Obviously, dealing with the over-propertization concerns regarding
databases is a tall order. This tall order is one reason why the E.U.
Database Directive has attracted so much criticism 154 and why the
15 5
United States Congress has not settled on a legislative approach.
Additionally, the approach taken to the over-propertization question is
likely to affect the form of laws that prevent bad faith access and use of
valuable databases. Professors Reichman and Samuelson, for instance,
15 6
advocate a tort/misappropriation approach to database protection.
This approach implicitly involves the classification of certain accesses
and uses of database contents as being in good faith or bad faith. It
prohibits
misappropriations
that
create
unfair
commercial
advantages. 15 7 Effectively, this is how "bad faith" is conceptualized
under this suggested model. This approach is also evident to some
extent in at least one of the bills drafted in the United States to protect
158
database producers.
If the question of protecting legitimately asserted property interests in
information products can be addressed under a broader cohesive
152. Lipton, Balancing Private Rights, supra note 13, at 798; Reichman & Samuelson, supra
note 10, at 70-73; Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 18, at 811-12.
153. This is a difficult question and has, to date, been a key reason why acceptable database
protection legislation has not been enacted yet in the United States. See HUGHES, supra note 145,
at 29 (noting that opposition from American research and library communities complicated the
issue of database protection legislation during the WIPO process of drafting an international
database protection treaty).
154. Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 10, at 84-95 (criticizing the scope of the E.U
Database Directive and discussing the resulting weaknesses); see also Colston, supra note 128,
§ 2.3 (discussing the broad definition of the sui generis right).
155. HUGHES, supra note 145, at 10-11.
156. Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 10, at 140-44.
157. Id. at 141-43.
158. Consumer and Investor Access to Information Act of 1999, H.R. 1858, 106th Cong. §
102 (1999). The aim of this bill is to prevent unfair commercial conduct by distribution of
wholesale copies of a database in direct competition with the original database producer.

2003]

Mixed Metaphors in Cyberspace

framework such as that suggested in this Article, it may usefully inform
the development of database protection law per se. Legislators would
be able to focus on all potential aspects of bad faith conduct in relation
to a database, such as access, use, damage or destruction, and theft or
misappropriation at the same time. This might enable legislators to
more effectively counterbalance acceptable good faith uses of
information against unacceptable bad faith incursions in a more
harmonized and consistent manner.
V. CONCLUSION: FUTURE APPROACHES TO INFORMATION PROPERTY

The above comparisons of the patchwork of laws within the United
States and the European Union dealing with bad faith intrusions into
proprietary information products evidence that the underlying concerns
between jurisdictions and among different classes of information assets
are largely the same. Those holding valuable information assets are
seeking first to assert a form of a property or quasi-property right in
their assets to facilitate commercial dealings in the assets and, second,
to protect those assets against bad faith access, use, damage or
destruction, and theft or misappropriation.
This Article suggests that there might now be an opportunity to
reformulate laws relating to the protection of information property
against bad faith interferences by utilizing a more unified and cohesive
policy framework than was used in the past. Of course, difficult issues
have arisen in both the United States and the European Union regarding
the assertion of legal property rights in many information assets. This
Article does not seek to belittle the difficulties arising in this area. Any
laws that create and/or promote the assertion of property rights in
information should be drafted realistically in a manner that is sensitive
159
to competing good faith interests in information.
As noted in Part II.C, however, regardless of what legislators do or
fail to do in creating information property rights, the market itself will
develop new ways to treat commercially valuable items as property to
facilitate trade in those items. In the absence of trade secret legislation,
individual parties have relied on contractual provisions to protect
commercial confidences in the United Kingdom. 160 By the same token,

159. Competing good faith interests in information may comprise rights to privacy in relation
to personal information or rights to access and use information for public interest purposes, such
as scientific, educational, research purposes, etc. Lipton, Rights and Responsibilities, supra note
14.
160. In jurisdictions with a significant equitable jurisprudence, equity has also had a role to
play in protecting commercial confidences. See CORNISH, supra note 132, 1 8-06; McKEOUGH &
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in the absence of sui generis database protection legislation, American
businesses have relied on contractual provisions and technological
protection measures to assert quasi-property rights in databases.
Whether or not legislators create property rights, market players will
seek to limit others from accessing, using, damaging or destroying,
and/or misappropriating valuable information without authorization.
What legislators can do is recognize these classes of conduct as the
activities that concern information property owners. Legislators can
ensure that they enact a sensible and coherent framework of laws for the
digital information age that protects information property owners
against bad faith unauthorized conduct of these types, while permitting
16 1
good faith conduct.
Any such laws should focus on protecting legitimate property
interests in information per se, rather than indirectly protecting valuable
information through the protection of the physical, tangible attributes of
information systems, such as the computers in which information is
stored physically and the cables through which it may be disseminated
physically. In the words of Dane McLeod, the laws should focus on the
162
data rather than the box to achieve the desired policy results.
These results could be achieved in a variety of ways. One very
simple approach would be to retain the category-specific laws that are
currently organized around different types of information, but to
develop those laws in accordance with the express policy of protecting
each class of information property against unauthorized access, use,
damage or destruction, and theft or misappropriation.
Thus, there still would be completely separate types of property
interests in different information assets, such as software and databases.
Software might attract copyright and/or patent protection as it currently
does. Databases might be protected under copyright law in some
jurisdictions and/or through a sui generis scheme in others. However,
as each of those fields of law develops in relation to those specific
information assets, legislators would keep in mind the basic framework
of preventing unauthorized access, unauthorized use, damage, and/or
misappropriation of these items by those with bad faith motives.

STEWART, supra note 132, 4.14 (noting the important role of equitable jurisprudence relating to
third party liability).
161. As noted above, good faith interests in information may comprise rights to privacy
relating to personal information or rights to access and use information for public interest
purposes, such as scientific, educational, and research purposes. See supra note 159 and

accompanying text.
162.

McLeod, supra note 1, at 350-52.
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Another approach might be to develop an entirely new field of
information property law that would group together all valuable
information products under the generic heading of "information
property," regardless of whether some of those information assets might
attract the existing protections set out in Tables 1 and 2.163 Thus,
computer software, trade secrets, databases, etc. would all generically
be classified as "valuable information products," and a completely new
set of information property laws could be developed prohibiting bad
faith conduct in terms of unauthorized access, use, damage or
destruction, and/or misappropriation. This would be an ambitious
project; delineating the boundaries of information property rights in the
first place to avoid over-propertization concerns would present a
significant challenge.
The advantage of this approach is that it would take a comprehensive
and cohesive attitude toward matters of general concern to market
players in the digital economy. Further, there would be little need to
amend any existing laws, as the new legal framework would be unlikely
to contradict provisions of current copyright, patent, trade secret, and
database laws. The framework would simply fill in some of the gaps in
those preexisting laws relating to the protection of information products.
This approach also would remove the focus of information property law
from the boxes in which information is stored and emphasize the
information itself.
Focusing on the data rather than the box is a more logical approach
given that market players generally are likely to be much more
concerned with loss or damage to the value of their information than to
physical attributes of the systems in which information is stored and
through which it is transmitted. Where there is a concern with damage
to a physical system due to real-world vandalism, current criminal and
tort laws should deal with those situations. This is not problematic.
What has been problematic in the past is the confusing emphasis on
systems when the plaintiff's complaint is actually more likely to be
about damage to the value of information stored in the system.
Overall, we should not worry about accepting property metaphors in
cyberspace and protecting information property rights as such. We
simply have to ensure that we are utilizing appropriate metaphors in
appropriate ways. An information system is comprised of individual
components of tangible personal property. The information within the
system may be considered a species of intangible personal property.
163. Lipton, Framework, supra note 14 (suggesting the development of an information law
and policy framework more generally).
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None of these items should be regarded as a species of real property.
The property terminology is unobjectionable if conscious attempts are
made to ensure that it is not loaded with inappropriate connotations and
that property rights are not allowed to lead inevitably to unfair
monopolies. 164 The legal system has coped with various classes of
property rights over many, many years. The property concept can be
flexible enough to cope with new situations and challenges, and,
importantly, it does not necessarily have to connote any particular set of
rights other than those of an item of value with which people desire to
16 5
trade in a market.

164. Chander, supra note 10, at 778 (contending that property rights are never absolute and
are always controllable to some degree by government).
165. See Litman, supra note 54, at 1293-96 (discussing the use of property fights regimes
when alienability is of primary importance); Rao, supra note 54, at 364 (citing transferability of
rights as the key characteristic of property).

